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in his poem, ‘september 1, 1939’, w h auden 
famously cast his eyes back over the pre-war 
period on a day on which ‘the clever hopes  
of a low dishonest decade’ expired. future 
historians may well characterise the opening 
years of this century in similar terms. one by  
one, our institutions have been shown to have 
feet of clay: parliament (doctored intelligence 
reports and bogus expense claims); the church 
(child abuse cover-ups); sport (bribery and 
doping); the media (phone hacking) and 
media-police relations; even the european  
union (fiscal irresponsibility among its peripheral 
members). cumulatively, these revelations –  
often belatedly – have helped undermine  
public trust in our national and international 
institutions. 
Business stands prominently in the dock. 
successive waves of corporate scandals have 
sapped public confidence: enron, the madoff 
fraud and – most notably – the re-selling in 
complex and dubiously repackaged forms,  
of subprime mortgage debt that, coupled with 
reckless over-exposure, triggered the global 
banking and financial crisis of 2008. rows  
about interbank lending rate fixing, insurance 
policy mis-selling, fuel and energy pricing and 
exorbitant executive remuneration rumble on.
corporate illegality – actions that violate 
administrative, civil or criminal law, and for  
which the organization is the primary intended 
beneficiary represent egregious examples of  
the ‘dark side’ of organizations. in 2003 it was 
estimated that in the us alone corporate fraud 
ranges from $200 to $400 billion each year. 
moralists might say that humanity is inherently 
greedy and deceitful and does not change.  
But there seems across these cases to have been 
some larger condition at work, some collective 
suspension of disbelief amounting almost to  
a conspiracy, conscious or unconscious, between 
business, the media, regulators and government 
and society. to trace its operation, rather than 
consider the now widely aired anglo-american 
cases, we turned our lens on a more tightly 
focused example: italy’s once-feted international 
success story, parmalat.
we asked not only how and why illegality  
occurs but also how it is actively sustained  
by organizations despite their being encircled  
and policed by an elite cluster of gatekeepers.  
we found that cognitive assumptions generate 
expectations that can, under specific 
circumstances, induce organizations to amplify 
illegal actions and that serve to lessen regulatory 
scrutiny. we also found that, once initiated, 
illegal actions can become hidden because  
of institutionalized practices that enable their 
concealment and that weaken the prospect  
of detection. these processes and effects are 
particularly noticeable in networks of professional 
regulators. in all these ways the institutional 
context is an unwitting accomplice in corporate 
illegality.
‘ sTraTegIC foCus: what makes parmalat 
a wiNNer’
 (merrill lynch, 1998)
‘ wheN they preseNted the data oN their 
BoNds … i tried to tell some of the 
participaNts that the thiNg was Not clear  
to me, But they stared at me like i was  
aN alieN’
 (securities analyst)
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many studies have tried to trace the motivation 
behind corporate illegality. some have suggested 
poorly performing firms act illegally in order to 
survive whereas high-performing firms have less 
incentive to do so. the opposite, however, appears 
to be the case: in efforts to maintain an upward 
trajectory of performance even ‘good’ firms 
engage in illegality. 
structural features, such as an organization’s  
size, its division of labour and complexity,  
and the extent to which decision processes are 
decentralized, have been identified as sources 
providing opportunities for concealment. others 
have pointed to ceo compensation as a possible 
motivator, but in fact there is no consistent 
evidence that compensation arrangements  
are associated with the occurrence or absence  
of fraud. 
some have suggested that the structure of  
the board of directors is key because policing  
by external directors removes opportunities  
for concealment. in contrast it has been argued  
that ‘operational governance mechanisms’ –  
such as accounting procedures, codes of conduct, 
and human resource practices – play a bigger  
role than traditional governance mechanisms  
in preventing white-collar crime’.
fundamental differences in ownership and 
governance structures certainly shape the kind  
of fraud that will occur and its likely perpetrators. 
european firms are typically owned and  
controlled by small ownership groups and there 
are fewer shareholder protection requirements, 
circumstances that offer opportunities for  
looting by the owners. in the us, widespread 
share ownership and a range of oversight 
practices (boards of directors, outside directors, 
independent audit committees), minimize these 
opportunities. in the us, therefore, fraud more 
typically involves the manipulation of earnings  
in order to artificially increase a firm’s share price 
in order to benefit ceos compensated through 
stock options.
organizational culture has also been implicated 
because of the way it can dull moral awareness. 
cultures that emphasize ends at the expense of 
means can lead to moral shortcuts. in the enron 
affair the linking of material and symbolic rewards 
to the attainment of extraordinary levels of 
performance created norms that insitutionalized 
illegality. similarly it has been shown how the 
culture at salomon Brothers endorsed the 
portrayal of customers as deserving of exploitation 
because of their ignorance, how hubris in wall 
street investment banks rationalised questionable 
professional acts, and how ‘ethical fading’ can 
occur as lawyers become more accepting of 
practices as they become more experienced.
collectively, studies identify three preconditions 
for corporate illegality: the motivation to engage 
in corporate illegality, the provision of opportunities 
for it to occur, and the exercise of choice to 
exploit those opportunities – all of which were 
present in the case of parmalat.
according to the sec, parmalat, a large, 
multinational italian dairy and food corporation 
practised ‘one of the largest and most brazen 
corporate financial frauds’ in the decade before  
it filed for bankruptcy in 2003. investigations 
revealed that the company’s reported financial 
condition had long been sustained by systematic 
and accounting misrepresentation. 
founded by calisto tanzi in 1961 as a family-run 
milk company, it achieved national leadership  
in the production of uht (ultra high temperature) 
milk in the late 1960s and then diversified into 
other dairy products. in the 1980s parmalat 
began offering bakery products, tomato sauces, 
and fruit juices, resulting in a portfolio of more 
than 250 products. in 1990 the company was 
listed on Borsa Italiana and in the following 
decade acquired over 200 companies across  
50 countries. By 2002 the company operated 
139 industrial plants, had over 36,000 
employees and a turnover of 7.6 billion euros.
parmalat’s growth strategy was based on 
acquisitions financed by debt. during the 1990s 
6 billion euros were borrowed through the issue  
of over 30 bonds. however, it became evident 
even within parmalat that this strategy was 
flawed: most acquisitions and investments  
had proved to be less profitable than expected; 
synergies between acquired businesses were  
not forthcoming; and market leadership usually 
did not materialize. acquisitions were sometimes 
made in countries that later faced serious 
economic crises, depressing market performance. 
in consequence, parmalat’s debt soared from 
386,000 euros in 1990 to 5 billion euros in 
2000. in order to deliver acceptable returns on  
its investments and maintain its share price and 
its ability to raise money through bonds, parmalat 
began to overstate its revenues and profits.  
Net earnings were ‘corrected’ upwards by around 
31 million euros in 1990 and by over one billion 
euros in 2002. 
the increasing failure of its growth strategy and 
the scale of parmalat’s deception are summarized 
in figure 2, which contrasts the firm’s reported 
and actual net earnings. 1998 was the pivotal 
year, when a plunging gap between actual and 
reported earnings opened up. the worsening 
situation was concealed by inflating revenues  
and – on the advice of grant thornton’s audit 
partners – transferring debt to shell companies  
set up in mainly caribbean offshore tax havens. 
such was the success of this that parmalat’s 
share price peaked in 2002 at 3.7 billion euros. 
in 2002 standard & poor’s actually raised 
its outlook for parmalat from ‘stable’ to ‘positive’, 
and only one analyst recommended ‘sell’ in 
contrast to 26 others that recommended ‘hold’  
or ‘buy’.
The Theory of CorporaTe CrIme The parmalaT affaIr 
Parmalat, a large, multinational italian dairy and 
food corPoration Practised ‘one of the largest  
and most brazen corPorate financial frauds’ in  
the decade before it filed for bankruPtcy in 2003
in efforts to maintain an uPward trajectory of 
Performance even ‘good’ firms engage in illegality 
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the situation changed dramatically towards  
the end of 2002 when parmalat unexpectedly 
launched several private placements on the  
us market. for the first time, requests for 
financing received lukewarm responses. parmalat 
sought to dampen these concerns by providing 
some additional information. But when parmalat 
subsequently attempted a new bond issue in 
2003 investors’ concerns were again raised. 
Consob, the italian securities and exchange 
commission, asked parmalat for more information 
about the company’s finances.
as concerns became public, the company’s  
share price dropped significantly, forcing  
parmalat to cancel the issue. the italian asset 
management association criticised the firm’s  
lack of transparency, and parmalat immediately 
announced that the chief financial officer had 
been replaced. the market reacted positively and 
parmalat’s share price promptly soared. however, 
renewed optimism proved fleeting. analysts began 
to question why the company was sitting on such 
a large cash pile, if no major acquisitions were  
in the pipeline. Il Sole 24 Ore asked bluntly: 
‘no one understands why parmalat continues  
to raise funds on the market despite having over 
3.5 billion cash. the question thus remains:  
why so many bonds?’
in 2003 the italian professional accounting 
association declared that auditors would  
be held responsible for the separate accounts  
of subsidiary companies in a group, even if these 
accounts had been formally audited by other 
accounting firms. only then did deloitte & touche 
probe beyond grant thornton’s signature and 
conduct its own analysis of parmalat’s secondary 
accounts. having done so, they issued a 
‘disclaimer’ on the company’s 2003 first-half 
financial accounts because the true value of  
its investment in a cayman islands-based private 
equity fund, epicurum (whose value had been 
approved by grant thornton) could not be 
determined.
parmalat was then forced to reveal that  
most of its supposed liquidity was invested  
in epicurum. following increasing criticism, 
parmalat liquidated its position in epicurum  
but almost immediately defaulted on an  
expiring bond because the necessary funds  
were not forthcoming, triggering a collapse  
in its share price. Consob responded by asking 
grant thornton, the auditors of Bonlat (another 
parmalat-owned cayman island company),  
to provide details of an account with the Bank  
of america that supposedly contained 3.9 billion 
euros (38% of the group’s total assets). this 
turned out to be a forgery. parmalat filed for 
bankruptcy and was declared insolvent with  
a deficit of 14 billion euros – almost twice the 
group’s 2002 annual turnover.
investigations into parmalat began in the court  
of parma early in the following year. several 
former directors and managers of parmalat were 
accused of fraudulent bankruptcy, alleging both 
criminal operations and looting. investigation also 
began in the court of milan, the allegations being 
stock price manipulation, obstruction to controls 
carried out by the securities and exchange 
commission and financial misrepresentation  
by deloitte & touche and grant thornton.
calisto tanzi, the former chief executive officer  
of parmalat, and fausto tonna, the former chief 
financial officer, were respectively sentenced  
to twenty six and sixteen years imprisonment  
for stock price manipulation and fraudulent 
bankruptcy. accountants from grant thornton 
were also given jail sentences for explicitly 
assisting the fraud by the creation of the special 
vehicles by which the fraud could be concealed, 
and both grant thornton and deloitte touche 
were heavily censured and fined.
one of the most striking features of the parmalat 
case was the duration of the fraud. according  
to the public prosecutor, it began in 1990 and 
continued undetected for twelve years. few, if  
any, financial observers saw through it. standard  
& poor’s maintained an investment grade rating  
up to ten days before parmalat sought bankruptcy 
protection. similarly, the leading international 
banks that received substantial fees for 
processing bonds and private placements for  
us investors raised no concerns or doubts about 
parmalat’s financial situation. further, neither  
of parmalat’s auditors – grant thornton and 
deloitte & touche – raised any questions about 
the company’s financial health until November 
2003.
almost all financial journalists and securities 
analysts sang enthusiastically from the same  
song sheet. in the three years prior to 2003  
only 92% of journalists’ articles were positive  
or neutral in tenor. securities analysts consistently 
issued positive recommendations. over the  
whole 1993-2003 period only 7% made  
‘sell’ recommendations and 78% of their ‘buy’ 
recommendations were actually made in the  
three years before the company went broke. 
in short, despite dealing with the world’s largest 
banks, highly sophisticated investors and analysts, 
and two of the largest international audit firms, 
and despite regular coverage from the business 
media, parmalat was able to conceal its illegal 
corporate behaviour for over a decade. how  
could this sustained strategy of deception have 
succeeded?
The parmalaT affaIr continued
fIgure 2: parmalat’s actual aNd reported Net earNiNgs (iN millioN euro)
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ConClusIons
in the case of parmalat we identified three main 
preconditions for corporate illegality:
1. muTually reInforCIng InsTITuTIonal 
endorsemenTs 
institutional expectations played a key role  
in the formulation and execution of parmalat’s 
strategy. parmalat retained its growth strategy – 
even as the firm became aware of its shortcomings 
– because it believed it was important to behave  
as analysts expected in order to receive their 
endorsement and access further resources.  
as parmalat’s commitment to its demonstrably 
failing growth strategy lurched in the mid-1990s 
towards deliberate deception, its alignment with 
the conventional expectations of analysts continued 
to generate institutional endorsement, which  
in turn facilitated more borrowing, thus further 
fuelling the cycle of concealment and deception. 
analysts accepted parmalat’s argument that  
growth and debt go hand-in-hand because  
it was consistent with their perceptions of  
what constitute appropriate corporate behaviour.  
By apparently doing what financial institutions 
believed to be appropriate and complying with  
their financial logic parmalat’s strategy was 
perceived as legitimate and repeatedly endorsed, 
and the group was able to continue raising funds. 
endorsement of debt as a natural consequence  
of a strategy of acquisition-led growth encouraged 
parmalat to renew its commitment to the same 
strategy even as its financial position worsened – 
initially because the group believed in it, and later 
because doing so reduced the risk of inspection.
2. regulaTory loopholes 
the regulatory conventions of audit and investment 
analysis provided parmalat with many loopholes  
for exploitation. in forming opinions of complex 
corporations, securities analysts and institutional 
investors typically do not collect and examine 
accounts embracing all the companies within  
a corporate group. instead, they rely on the group’s 
consolidated accounts and the accounts of its 
major subsidiaries. parmalat deliberately exploited 
this in two ways. first, it boosted its consolidated 
revenues by inflating the results of an off-shore 
company whose financial statements were not 
available to market analysts. second, it concealed 
the accumulated debt by means of intra-group 
transactions. 
a further regulatory convention exploited by 
parmalat was the financial market’s emphasis  
upon ‘net debts’ – the difference between financial 
debts and liquidity and ‘net financial interests’. 
the deception worked. parmalat was repeatedly 
able to draw attention to its (apparently) growing 
liquidity. these reserves, however, were non-
existent. parmalat was simply constructing  
its accounts in ways that passed scrutiny when 
assessed against the conventional metric –  
net debt – used by the markets. 
regulatory loopholes allowed parmalat to appear 
successful even as its financial performance 
worsened. But these loopholes could only have 
been exploited so successfully if regulators and 
analysts were lax in their vigilance. so why were 
the institutional gatekeepers surrounding parmalat 
so sleepy in undertaking their roles?
3. The asCrIpTIon of CelebrITy sTaTus 
status acts as a signal of merit and worthiness,  
a surrogate of competency and probity that 
removes the glare of inspection that might 
otherwise occur. parmalat deliberately associated 
itself with elite members of the financial 
community, publicly displaying its relationships 
with large, high status banks such as deutsche 
Bank, citicorp, schroeder investment management 
and hermes investment ltd.
this had an interesting side-effect: parmalat  
was hailed as the ‘italian’ success story. its 
international presence was reported with more  
than a hint of national pride. Il Sole 24 Ore 
described parmalat as one of the very few italian 
companies to ‘conquer the world’ and with the 
ability to ‘represent italy in the landscape of the 
major european dairy competitors’.
the risk of erroneous ascriptions of soundness  
is heightened by the excessive closeness between 
analysts and those whom they are investigating.  
it has long been argued that for various reasons 
auditors are at risk of ‘client capture’. as auditors 
become overly reliant upon clients for more 
lucrative consulting engagements, they too  
often treat the audit itself as a loss leader and in 
consequence provide only cursory audit analysis. 
client capture involves a willingness to compromise 
an audit scrutiny in order to gain future or 
additional engagements. the underlying rationale 
is cognitive: a form of calculated cost-benefit 
analysis. the parmalat case, in contrast, underlines 
the importance of maintaining due ‘social 
distance’.
But more importantly, the parmalat story  
illustrates a second aspect of status ascription:  
the unhealthily close relationships between 
members of a financial network. this vulnerability  
is exacerbated by the tendency to observe and 
follow the behavior of other members of the 
network. particularly important in the parmalat 
network were the two audit firms: grant thornton, 
and deloitte & touche. as these analysts 
pronounced favourably on parmalat, others followed 
suit. But, rather than the outcome of independent 
analysis and scrutiny, these confirmations reflected 
what has been called ‘mimetic herding’, the 
tendency of a group to copy and adopt common 
beliefs and behaviour. 
such a network of relationships was certainly 
present in the parmalat case – most analysts  
knew each other, had similar educational 
backgrounds, met regularly at corporate 
presentations, attended the same events at the 
milan stock exchange, and were members of  
the same professional association. they read  
each other’s reports and informally exchanged 
views when they met. in consequence, their views 
converged. 
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Parmalat’s story raises a range of serious 
questions about the behaviour of financial  
markets as currently designed
The WIder ImplICaTIons
undoubtedly, parmalat’s position was buttressed  
by the norms of ‘third italy’, that central-
northeastern region of the country that saw a 
proliferation of small and medium firms in the 
1970s and 1980s. the common background  
of the actors there strengthened social cohesion, 
enhanced reciprocal trust and fostered strong 
personal ties between firms, the local community, 
and public authorities. in this context the 
processes of status ascription were particularly 
pronounced.
But we should hesitate before treating parmalat  
as a particularly italian case. the same processes 
played a role in North america. enron pursued  
the same growth strategy as parmalat and received 
the same positive market endorsement. enron  
also used loopholes in accounting principles  
and audit practices, including the division of 
responsibilities between two audit firms. and, 
significantly, enron was strongly embedded within 
a network of professional gatekeepers who signally 
failed to penetrate enron’s behavior.
another aspect of the parmalat story that  
deserves more detailed attention is how actions  
are reinforced and contribute to an escalation  
of commitment, even when the illegality of those 
actions becomes clear. in the case of grant 
thornton, for example, their initial suggestions for 
concealment were not expected to be long-term. 
the underlying motivation may be one of reluctant 
entrapment rather than acceptance. But once 
‘caught’, the practice of concealment escalates 
and cannot be reversed. it would be interesting  
to learn more of how initial, seemingly innocuous 
adjustments become patterns from which it is 
difficult to withdraw.
it would be informative to explore more fully the 
mechanisms that underlie the collective blindness 
of gatekeepers and the processes of celebrity 
ascription. do regulators, ratings agencies and 
financial journalists perform an accurate and 
objective job or do they merely act as the echo 
chambers of other interested constituencies? 
clearly, the role of professional networks is also  
a key issue here. But in the functioning of the 
financial market is that role a mutually valuable 
one? or does it rather represent the detrimental 
consequence of socialization within the financial 
community? we have mentioned ‘mimetic herding’, 
but other factors may come into play. outside 
members of boards of directors often do not 
express their concerns over a firm’s performance 
because of ‘pluralistic ignorance’: individual 
members may have concerns but mistakenly 
believe that all other members do not. a similar 
mechanism may occur within gatekeeper networks.
parmalat’s story raises a range of serious questions 
about the behaviour of financial markets as 
currently designed. it cautions against our own 
ascription of trust to them, and calls for fuller 
exploration.
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